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Abstract
My thesis aims to dissect the confounding factors that lead to the build up of social
tension between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese population. The three main
causes of this tension are the major increase in the wealthy population within China,
Hong Kong’s “autonomous” political status, and Hong Kong’s resource constraints.
My thesis also aims to provide suitable solutions to diminish or extinguish the
tension and give a logical prediction of Hong Kong’s economic, political and social
outlook in the upcoming years.
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Introduction
The relationship between Hong Kong and China is a difficult one to understand.
The economic relationship is perhaps the cornerstone of the cooperation. Hong
Kong has long been the world’s economic gateway into China and the economic
partnership between the two has been crucial to the economic prosperity of the
region and the country. The political relationship is best defined by the innovative
“one country two systems” policy after 1997. It is innovative in the sense that, under
special circumstances, a city was given the privilege to maintain its own
“autonomous” government. Unfortunately, the social or cultural relationship has
suffered at the expense of the progression of the economic and political partnership.
The reason for this is because social and cultural problems cannot be fixed by
growth and policies. It is a matter of human integration and assimilation that cannot
be measured by any metric and potentially the most important puzzle piece to
creating a productive and efficient synergy between Hong Kong and China.
“What happens when an immovable object collides with an unstoppable force?”
In such a ridiculous and outlandish scenario, would or could there be a winner? Would it
end in a stalemate? Or would it end in mutual destruction? The fact of the matter is, how
can an immovable object and an unstoppable force both exist on the same plain? If an
object is immovable, it is therefore not possible for an unstoppable force to exist and vice
versa. This scenario is known as the “Irresistible force paradox”, it is a hypothetical
situation that labels such as “immovable” or “unstoppable” are bogus and are merely
states of mind. In the minds of “Hong Kongers”, their resolve is immovable; their
influence is immeasurable, and their identity is unique. In the minds of the Mainland
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Chinese, their progress is unstoppable; their authority is absolute, and their reach is
unlimited. Presently, there is a growing conflict between the Hong Kong and Chinese
people. It is a conflict that has the potential to greatly damage the future cooperation and
partnership of two economic powerhouses. The emergence of this social tension is most
commonly attributed to a polarized society where a large minority group faces a majority
group. In Hong Kong case, after 99 years of colonization by the British, the Hong Kong
culture has created a unique, non-Chinese identity, and this social tension is perhaps
caused by the post-colonization and re-integration with Hong Kong’s origins, China. The
social and cultural tension between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese people has
developed due to the collective influences from China's rapidly growing economy, Hong
Kong's economic integration with China and "autonomous" political status, and its
territorial and resource constraints.
The Sino-Hong Kong relationship is an unavoidable and involuntary union. Hong
Kong was a part of an agreement from the Treaty of Nanking at the end of the first opium
war in 1842, between China and the British Empire. It was to become a colony of the
British Empire for 99 years and have its sovereignty transferred back to the China at the
end of the term. Prior to British rule, Hong Kong was developing port city with a
population of under 8,000. Today, Hong Kong has a population of seven million and has
developed into an international economic powerhouse (Horlemann).
Prior to the handover of Hong Kong, there was a lot of debate over how to handle
the issue of Hong Kong sovereignty between China and England. In 1984, the SinoBritish Joint Declaration was created and signed by Deng Xiaoping and Margaret
Thatcher (Horlemann). The objective of the declaration was to preserve Hong Kong’s
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existing territorial integrity by making Hong Kong a special administrative region, giving
birth to the concept and execution of One Country Two System. According to the
declaration, Hong Kong’s sovereignty and administrative institutions would remain intact
for 50 years, starting from handover. The declaration also set the date of the handover on
July 1st, 1997.
In 1997, Britain’s lease on Hong Kong territory was over. Though British gained
control over Hong Kong through somewhat scandalous means, many of the policies
implemented by the British had done wonders for the growth of Hong Kong, not only in
terms of economy, but also in terms of culture and identity. A century of English rule
forged a unique duel identity. England had gained control of Hong Kong when it was still
a tiny and insignificant island. They gave the island purpose; they made a miniscule dot
stand out on every map. In many ways, England is solely responsible for Hong Kong’s
tremendous progress. The Hong Kong people had grown superficially attached to the
England administration and had fallen victim to a bad case of Stockholm syndrome,
which is a scenario when hostages develop empathy for their captors. They feared the
transition to Chinese rule. During the time of the handover, China’s communist
government was still under a lot of scrutiny for what happened in Tiananmen Square.
They were often criticized for their centralized government and harsh rule. And the
international community feared that Hong Kong, an important international economic
hub, would fall victim to China’s suppression.
As 1997 drew near, many Hong Kong citizens feared the transfer of their
sovereignty to the People Republic of China. They had confidence in the protection of
personal liberties and rights and many people, especially civil servants and businessmen,
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sought a way out. However, England realized that a mass exodus of key economic and
political figures could incite turmoil within the Hong Kong economy and administration.
By 1994, 3% of Hong Kong’s labor force had immigrated to a foreign country. Countries,
such as the United States, Canada and Australia received overwhelming numbers of
immigration requests from Hong Kong. According to a China Morning Post news report
from 1995, it was projected that by 1997, 1 in 10 Hong Kong people would have acquired
foreign nationality (Goldammer). Local companies were even beginning to set up
overseas offices, to accommodate growing immigration concerns. In order to prevent the
imminent implosion within Hong Kong, the English government offered 50,000
households, up to 225,000 people, the right of abode in England without having to leave
Hong Kong, making an exception for the 50,000 households by waiving the country’s
residency requirements (Goldammer). Prior to 1997, potential Hong Kong immigrants
became highly sought after commodities. Countries viewed the opportunity as a chance
to enhance their own economic standing by selling their citizenship or lowering residency
requirements to attract prospective immigrants. Seychelles, an African island located in
the Indian Sea, was selling their citizenship for 10,000 rupee ($2,000 USD). Even more
prominent and wealthy places, such as Taiwan, were willing to lower their required
remittance and savings rate to lure these prospective immigrants (Goldammer). Canada,
the recipient of highest number of Hong Kong immigrants during the period of the mid
90s, had a simple way of obtaining a Canadian passport by investing in the Royal Bank
of Canada’s immigration fund for 5 years. Ad-campaigns for Canadian telecom
companies were targeted at Hong Kong immigrants who made many overseas calls. The
Canadian Imperial Bank had a designated Asian banking center located near the
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Chinatown of Calgary and various other cities (Goldammer). Currently, approximately
20% of Canada’s population is made up of Chinese immigrants, with a majority of the
20% made up of Hong Kong-Chinese immigrants and the majority of them immigrating
around the early to mid-90s (Goldammer).
After 15 years of maintaining the One Country Two System policy, Hong Kong
appears to have managed to maintain its autonomous status and has continued to establish
itself to be an economic powerhouse. Hong Kong citizens are no longer actively seeking
to leave, and immigration into Hong Kong has actually increased, due to the visa-free
benefits that the Hong Kong passport holds with many major countries and regions. On a
macro level, Hong Kong seems to be making steady strides toward maintaining its utopia.
On a micro level, turmoil and unrest are ever present. Hong Kong is presently battling a
major identity crisis, one that extends to the depths of its social and cultural roots. After
the handover in 1997, the Hong Kong people were incredibly resistant to assimilating
with the Mainland Chinese. They believed themselves to be superior, more educated and
more cultured than the Mainland Chinese, and in 1997, they may have been true. Hong
Kong people were definitely exposed to and spoiled with better benefits and higher
standards of living. During this time, Hong Kong was China’s greatest source of foreign
direct investment (FDI), which meant that China’s economy was hugely dependent on
Hong Kong’s economy. China’s economy was still not yet fully open and still running on
a very limited form of capitalism. Today, China is the fastest growing and second largest
economy in the world, only trailing the United States. Its economy is slowly shedding its
dependence on Hong Kong’s economy and the country’s wealth and standard of living
has improved substantially. That “superiority” that Hong Kong felt it had over the
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Mainland Chinese is diminishing. The two are now on equal ground and this has created
an incredible amount of tension between the two.
As a Hong Kong native, the city’s wellbeing is naturally at the top of my list of
major concerns. It is my duty as a Hong Kong citizen to familiarize myself with the city’s
economic, political and social climate. And since the 1997 handover, the developing
relationship between Mainland China and Hong Kong has been the focal point of all
facets of discussion. Their complex relationship not only holds the key to the future
prosperity of Hong Kong but also holds the key to redefining Hong Kong as “Chinese”
city.
My main goal for this thesis is to clearly dissect the growing social tension
between the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese. The reason I have chosen this particular
focus, is because this social tension has created an incredible amount of resentment in
both parties towards the other. If this negative sentiment from both parties continues to
worsen, it will hinder the chances of forming a mutually beneficial or synergetic
partnership between Hong Kong and China and put Hong Kong’s future wellbeing in
serious doubt. I believe the three main causes of the growing resentment are China’s
rapidly growing economy, Hong Kong’s “autonomous” political status, and Hong Kong’s
resource constraints. The next step is to find suitable and effective solutions that could
improve Sino-Hong Kong relations on a domestic and community level by understanding
the existing Sino-Hong Kong relationship.
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Chapter 1 – Money Can’t Buy Happiness
The economic dependence of Hong Kong on China and economic dependence
of China on Hong Kong has been an important factor in the development of China’s
economic and the region’s development. Since Hong Kong’s 1997 handover,
economic integration between the Hong Kong and Chinese economy has been a
much-discussed topic. However, before full economic integration can be achieved,
both parties much be working toward the same objective and both parties must be
completely willing and happy cooperate. Recent social tension that has developed
between the Hong Kong and Chinese people may hinder the progression of a fully
integrated economy. And one of the main causes of this social tension is China’s
rapidly developing economy.
In recent years, China has made giant strides towards eventually becoming
the largest economy in the world. In the process, China’s rapid economic
development has facilitated and engineered the creation of a generation of
“Nouveau Riche” that has created a major divide in the social and cultural
development of the nation. This new generation of wealth is very much
concentrated in the southeastern part of the country particularly in the Pearl River
Delta Region. In 2001, the Pearl River Delta region, which includes areas such as
Guangdong and Shenzhen, was home to only 3.3% of the nations population, but
accounted for 8.7% of the nation’s GDP, 24% of the nation’s FDI and most
impressive of all, 34.1% of the nation’s exports (Chen, Xiangming). The main reason
for the region’s affluence is due to its proximity to Hong Kong. Due to a lack of space
in Hong Kong, much of the city’s manufacturing sector was moved across the border
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during the 1980s and 1990s.
In the 1980s, Hong Kong’s
manufacture labor force
declined from 1 million
workers down to 250,000
workers. In 1997, Hong
Kong’s manufacturing
employment fell below

Figure 1 Hong Kong’s Labor migration

200,000, to account for only about 5.4% of the city’s entire work force. And in 2003,
close to 10 million jobs were created by 53,000 Hong Kong-invested factories in the
Pearl River Delta region (Chen, Xiangming). While this is not the full extent of Hong
Kong’s business partnership with China, it is certainly enough evidence that both
parties play a crucial role in the other’s economic progression.
China’s economy has made many drastic changes since the Maoist years of
the Chinese Communist Party and it is important to understand the country’s
historical economic development in order to better comprehend its modern day
economic status. In 1949, after Mao had just risen to power after defeating Chiang
Kaishek and the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War, Mao implemented China’s
first Five Year Plan in 1953, which was adopted from the Soviet economic model of
centralized planning and state owned sectors (Horlemann). The purpose of this first
Five Year Plan was to stimulate economic growth with a strong emphasis on heavy
industrials, such as iron and steel production. That first year of the Five Year Plan
resulted in real GDP growth of 15.6%, which was partially due to the land reforms
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put in place by Mao. The next four years produced real GDP growth of 4.2%, 6.8%,
15% and 5.1% (China’s GDP Growth – China Economic and Business News). As
Mao’s first economic initiative, the Five Year Plan was exceptionally successful in
establishing a solid foundation in the industrial sector of the country’s economy.
Mao’s second economic initiative, perhaps the most well known and
infamous, is the Great Leap Forward. It was an economic and social campaign that
lasted three years from 1958 – 1961. Its aim was to shift some of the economic
decision making to more provincial level, in an attempt to decentralize the authority
of the central government. The campaign’s target was utilize the country’s massive
population and labor force to create a production boom in all sectors, was particular
focuses in industrial and agricultural growth. The plan was to “leap” into economic
prosperity, but due to an insufficient amount of capital and resources to sustain the
large amounts of investment into the rapid industrialization of the country, the
country fell into deep crisis. The campaign was fundamentally flawed in the sense
that its use of commune systems and collectivization took away the labor forces’
incentive to work hard for the betterment of the nation. Many agricultural
communities greatly exaggerated or lied about their levels of production just to
please the central government; much of the nation’s capital was then diverted to
focus on steel production. The government took the grain that had been harvested
and used it to supply towns, cities and exports, leaving miniscule amounts for the
peasants. This caused the Great Chinese Famine, resulting in a death toll speculated
to be as high as 30 million. The Great Leap Forward was then followed by the
Cultural Revolution, which further disrupted economic development.
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In the late 70s – the early 80s, when Deng Xiaoping came to power after
Mao’s death, this was the turning point in China’s economic progress. His first order
of business was to reform China’s agricultural sector by abolishing Mao’s commune
system and establish privately owned plots of land, where farmers had to give a
certain level of production to the state but were allowed to keep any surpluses,
which gave farmers a great incentive to increase productivity; this was known as the
Household–responsibility system. This was the answer to China’s problem with food
shortages and was also the beginning of strong development within the agricultural
system. These reforms would reach urban industries as well. State-owned industries
were also now allowed to sell surpluses above the production quota. Private
business were allowed to be operate for the first time since Communist rule and the
establishment of special economic zones opened the country up to foreign
investment for the first time since the Kuomintang’s reign.
During this time, Hong Kong’s economic development was shifting. Its
manufacturing sector was a crucial section of the economy but by the 1970s, much
of the city’s manufacturing businesses had moved across the border to China and
the city was then transformed into a financial center. By the mid 1970s, Hong Kong
already assumed a crucial role in China’s economic development. It acted as a
gateway or a nexus into China’s market, where multinational businesses, resources
and capital would have to go through Hong Kong in order to reach China. At the
time, China’s manufacturing sector was booming due to the country’s excess land
and cheap labor. A common business set-up at the time was that multinational
businesses would set up regional headquarters in Hong Kong in order to manage
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company’s investments and the production process, which was entirely based in
China. These products would then be packaged and shipped from Hong Kong to the
world markets. This is also the reason why many of Hong Kong-invested factories
are set-up in the Pearl River Delta region. The proximity of the two locations allows
products to be transported easily and at cheaper costs.
This economic synergy between Hong Kong and China has been mutually
beneficial for many years. In recent years, the status quo has been changing, shifting
in favor of China. The economic dependence between the two is diminishing and
Hong Kong will be the one that suffers. In the 1980s – 1990s, companies who
outsourced China’s factories for mass production would ship raw materials through
Hong Kong because that was the only gateway into China. However, with the
increasing “openness” of the Chinese economic and trade policies, these raw
materials no longer have to go through Hong Kong. Now, these companies now have
direct interaction with the Chinese production sites and a lot of these raw materials
have also been increasingly sourced locally. Also, because of the increased
connection between these companies and the Mainland, many companies now also
have regional offices in large metropolitan Chinese cities such as Shanghai, to
oversee operations in China. Due to growing economic connections with China,
many of Hong Kong’s former functions and advantages, can now also be found in the
Mainland.
With the diminishing need for Hong Kong’s economic expertise, Hong Kong
has merely become a tourist destination for China and the tourist numbers have
been astronomical. In 2007, there were approximately 15 million Chinese tourists
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who went to Hong Kong, and in 2011,
there were approximately 28 million,
close to a 100% increase in just 4 years
(see figure 2). There are a few reasons
for the increase. Firstly, the major
increase in the nation’s wealth has
given the country much greater

spending power not only on a national
level but also on a personal level.

Figure 2 China tourists statistics
Sourrce: npr.org – For Hong Kong and Mainland,
Distrust only grows

Secondly, border regulation between Hong Kong and China has been relaxed
considerably in attempt to forge a stronger connection between the two. Thirdly,
Hong Kong’s (lack of) tax laws give the Mainland Chinese more incentive to spend
large amounts of money when on holiday in Hong Kong.
China’s diminished financial dependence, or rather increased financial
independence has put Hong Kong’s role as an Asian business hub in jeopardy. Much
of Hong Kong’s growth in economic achievement and reputation in the past decades
has been mainly attributed to the city’s integral role in China’s business model.
Multinational corporations that plan to establish their business in the Mainland now
no longer have to do so by setting up their regional offices in Hong Kong. These
companies now elect to have their regional offices within China as well.
Furthermore, since China is such a large country in terms of land, resources and
capital, and is still considered a developing country, there is much more opportunity
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and potential for innovation and entrepreneurship. Hong Kong, on the other hand,
faces a limited supply of land and resources to satisfy the needs of their own people.
It seems as if Hong Kong has reached the limit of its development potential, where
industries such as real estate and manufacturing, that once dominated the Hong
Kong market, almost have zero growth potential. This is evident when the many of
the large Hong Kong real estate companies, such as Shui On or Sun Heung Kai, have
a large portion of their business based in large Chinese cities such as Shanghai or
Chongqing.
While Hong Kong is still home to many of Asia’s largest companies, this
growing business trend has led to increased emphasis on Hong Kong’s financial and
service industries. This shift could be quite problematic for Hong Kong’s future.
Financial industries are largely based on the volume of the market and the activity
of the stock exchange. The city’s stock market will only continue to grow if
companies choose to list their companies there. However, cities like Shanghai and
Singapore already have plans to greatly expand the magnitude of their stock
exchanges, which could result in Hong Kong losing its claim on Asia’s premier stock
exchange. The service industry is solely based on consumption and Hong Kong’s
service industry is largely based on the city’s tourism. Hong Kong’s tourist
attractions do not only include the shopping, but tourist hotspots such as Victoria
Harbor, the Peak or even Disneyland draw many visitors, especially Chinese visitors
each year. As a result of rapid economic growth, many large Chinese cities now have
major development plans. For example, Shanghai has plans to build a Disneyland as
well, but the Disneyland does not have the same land constraints as the one in Hong
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Kong. The city can afford to create a theme park that is multitudes larger than the
one in Hong Kong. If major Chinese cities go through extreme upgrades, wouldn’t
these Chinese tourist that are flocking to Hong Kong each year rather stay within the
country and travel without the need for a visa? If this trend continues, everything
Hong Kong has to offer will soon be offered in China as well. This is an extremely
scary spectacle for the Hong Kong people who have enjoyed the spotlight for the
best part of a century. It is a direct hit to the city’s pride and the city’s morale. It is no
wonder many of the Hong Kong people resent Chinese businesses.
Despite the growing potential economical downfall of Hong Kong, The city
still possesses a few unique and redeeming qualities that are of great value to China.
Hong Kong functions on a completely free market economy that has a high volume
international trade with all corners of the globe. As a result, many Chinese
companies that seek overseas listings, often list in Hong Kong due to its status as a
premier financial center. In 2011, about 43% of companies listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange were Chinese companies, and these companies account for about
56% of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s market capitalization (The CIA World
Factbook - China). Furthermore, Hong Kong’s relatively liberal and democratic
administration is perhaps the biggest appeal to China. Its service industry is
incredibly advanced and established compared to that of China’s. Its government
benefits and standards of living are far superior to majority of the places in China,
with exception to the large metropolitan cities or special economic zones, such as
Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen or Chongqing.
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Moving forward, Hong Kong must acknowledge that it no longer holds an
integral position in China’s economic growth, and may even face potential economic
regression. It is also important to understand that Hong Kong’s relationship with the
Chinese extends far beyond its economic ties.
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Chapter 2 – One Country One System
The political dynamic of an institution or an organization is always essential
to its economic and social prosperity. For example, a well-managed company that
utilizes all its resources and capital efficiently and creates a “healthy” working
environment for its employees, will not only rake in high returns, but will also
create a great sense of cohesiveness within the company. In colloquial terms, this is
called a “well-oiled machine”, and politics is the key to creating and maintaining this
“well-oiled machine”. The political dynamic of a country is perhaps the most crucial
factor for its success. The politics of a country is not just about raising the GDP or
satisfying everyone’s need. The politics of a country is so much more complex.
History has proven that there is no black and white or right or wrong solution, when
it comes to the issue of politics. Leaders and administrative bodies of nations have
always cited their motivation to “do what is best for the country”, but who decides
what is best for the country? Such a horribly subjective and abstract idea can “make
or break” a country.
In the next 35 years, China has an incredibly difficult decision to make. This
decision has to do with the political fate of the Special Administrative Region of
Hong Kong. In 1842, when the Treaty of Nanking was signed, Hong Kong would
become a crown colony of Great Britain until 1997, where its sovereignty would be
handed back to China. In the early stages of Hong Kong role as Great Britain’s crown
colony, it was only a small port with a population of under 10,000, but due to its
central geographical location in Asia, Hong Kong was transformed into a prominent
metropolitan financial powerhouse. Since the post-Mao era of the Chinese
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administration, Hong Kong has played a key role in China’s economic progress and
success, acting as a gateway and an offshore management center for business that
plan to enter into China. Much of Hong Kong’s value and appeal lies in the fact that
its government is relatively much more liberal and democratic in comparison to the
Chinese government. These two key aspects of a free market economy and a
comparatively liberal and democratic society is the make-up of the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong sports a very unique administration that was installed as a result
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was signed by Deng Xiaoping and
Margaret Thatcher in 1984. The declaration basically states that after the handover
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997, China are required to preserve the political and
economy autonomy of Hong Kong for 50 years, thus giving birth to the first-of-itskind principle of One Country Two System (Horlemann). Soon after the signing of
the declaration, the first draft of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the city’s constitution. The
Basic Law was drafted by a drafting committee, which consisted of important
government officials from both Hong Kong and China. Its purpose was to create a
fundamental blueprint for HKSAR’s functionality and management. It was quickly
established in the Basic Law that Hong Kong’s allegiance was first and foremost, to
China. Furthermore, Hong Kong autonomy is a privilege granted and approved by
the National People’s Congress of China. As article 1 and 2 of the Hong Kong Basic
Law states:
Article 1 reads:
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People’s
Republic of China.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR)
21

Article 2 reads:
“The National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with
the provisions of the Law.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR)
While the two initial articles of the Basic Law do not hold more weight than other
articles do, it provides insight about the drafting process. As the drafting committee
consists of members of both Hong Kong and Chinese administration, it was
important for the members of the Chinese administration to establish the fact that
despite Hong Kong’s autonomous privileges, it was very important to remember
that Hong Kong was functioning under the umbrella of the People’s Republic of
China.
The 1997 handover was met with a lot of hostility. Many people were
extremely worried about what would happen to Hong Kong’s sovereignty under
China, particularly due to the events that happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
The Tiananmen Square incident was incited by death of Hu Yaobang, who served as
the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary in 1980. Hu was an avid reformer
who believed in channeling this discontent of the public as well as increased
liberalization within China. During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, the CCP’s chairman,
was the supreme leader of the CCP. He ran an incredibly rigid administration,
mainly focusing on economic reforms and allowing little space for social reform.
Hu’s was forced to resign in 1986 because of his open criticism of the Party’s topranking officials. Due to his ideas for liberalization, Hu gained a large following
amongst the country’s youth and student population. His sudden death in 1989 was
the main trigger for the students’ march on Tiananmen Square, a march that was
22

met with brute force from the CCP government. The time gap between the
Tiananmen incident and Hong Kong’s handover was only a short eight years. Any
fear from the Hong Kong was arguably justified. By 1997, the uncertainty drove
many Hong Kong citizens to actively seek one-way routes out of Hong Kong. Many of
them immigrating to places such as Canada, Great Britain, America and Australia.
In retrospect, Hong Kong’s mass exodus in the mid 90s was somewhat
irrational. People left because they feared China’s rule would spillover, reinstalling
Hong Kong’s identity as apart of China. To a certain extent, much of Hong Kong’s
pride derives from the fact that such a small city possesses so much power and
influence over its own territory as well as the region. It is in a sense, Hong Kong’s
integrity to have the power to make its own decisions, which of course is resulted
from the colonization of Great Britain. The People’s Republic of China, however, did
not ever allow such political or economic freedom to any region of the country. As a
communist state, it is essential to have a centralized and concentrated power
structure, where the central government has absolute control over all aspects of the
country. In the past 20-30 years, China has started to undergo a gradual decentralization, where some of the country’s planning and decision-making authority
has been diluted to a provincial level. Despite China’s progressive stray from
communist structure and fundamentals, its political and economic functionality is
still extremely restricted as compared to Hong Kong’s political and economic
functionality. The creation of One Country Two System effectively eliminated the
need for China to reformat Hong Kong’s government and also helped avoid any
major social uproar and helped preserve much of Hong Kong’s intrinsic value.
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The One Country Two System principle has definitely been hugely beneficial
and successful for both China as well as Hong Kong, in terms of sustaining Hong
Kong’s role as an international financial center, which is also beneficial to China, and
preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy. However, there are a few major problems that
have been caused by the One Country Two System principle. When examined
closely, the One Country Two System is in fact just a temporary barrier that slows
down the inevitable assimilation between Hong Kong and China. In this scenario
where 1.3 billion people and 7 million people have to find a way to get along, who do
you think holds that power and who do you think will be the one to make changes?
Despite One Country Two System and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, there is a
conspicuous pattern that proves that China’s is slowly but surely taking charge.
Firstly, the Mainland Chinese hugely influenced the drafting process of Hong Kong’s
Basic Law, not only due to the fact that the drafting committee consisted of Chinese
members, but also due to relative bargaining power both parties had at the time.
The One Country Two System was a sign of leniency and mercy granted by the
Chinese government. The most important thing to understand about One Country
Two System is that all of Hong Kong’s liberties and rights are protected by the
Chinese government, and that it is a privilege, as stated in article 1 & 2 of the Basic
Law. Second and thirdly, Hong Kong’s government is divided into three main
branches, the Judicial Council, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. The
Chinese government has extended its influence deep into the Executive and
Legislative Council. Hong Kong’s “leader” is known as the Chief Executive and
according to the Basic Law, the CE is to be appointed by the Central People’s

24

Government and selected through elections, which means that the appointment of a
CE can only be legitimized by the CPG. Furthermore, each CE is to serve in five-year
terms and serve a maximum of two consecutive terms (China – The Basic Law of
HKSAR). Since the 1997 handover until now, there have been a total of three CEs.
And since 1997, the Chinese government has been passively nudging partyapproved candidates to run for election, by “endorsing” these candidates publically.
Prior to 1997, Tung Chee Hwa was identified as the “ideal” candidate for the post of
Chief Executive, mainly because of his background as a businessman and his vision
of helping Hong Kong become an economic center that would play an integral role in
the reform and modernization of China (Horlemann). In 2005, Tung Chee Hwa
stepped down due to a combination of poor performance and health problems.
However, the Hong Kong media attributed Tung’s resignation to the loss of support
from the PRC government. After Tung’s resignation, Donald Tsang, who was Hong
Kong’s Chief Secretary of Administration (Hong Kong’s #2), received the full support
of the PRC government to take over as the CE. Due to an incomplete term from Tung,
Tsang had to complete the rest of Tung’s term as acting CE and run for office once
again in 2007. In 2007, Tsang was reelected as Hong Kong’s CE, winning over 80%
of the votes from the election committee (Chen Te-Ping, Chester Yung –
online.wsj.com). In 2012, Hong Kong’s CE elections were full of conspiracy. The
candidate endorsed by the PRC Government, Henry Tang, was plagued with rumors
of an affair as well as allegations for violating construction laws during the
construction of his home. This caused the PRC to withdraw their endorsement for
this candidate. Tang would lose the election to Leung Chun Ying in a landslide
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victory. While public endorsements can be effective, the most crucial aspect to Hong
Kong’s CE election is the election committee, which now consists of 1,200 members
elected from 28 functional constituencies, such as agriculture, real estate and
finance, that each gets an assigned number of seats. The National People’s Congress
also gets 36 seats in the committee (2011 Election Committee Subsector Elections).
Many people voiced concerns about the members of the committee. Citing the
reason that many of the members are Hong Kong’s richest, all of who have a lot of
business in China. The most prominent members of the committee include business
magnet, Li Ka Shing, Hong Kong’s richest man and the 9th richest in the world and
Thomas Kwok, co-chairman of Hong Kong’s largest real estate developer, Sun Hung
Ki. With a portion of the election committee affiliated with the PRC in some form
another, steering the outcome of the election would not be difficult.
Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, also known as LEGCO, has perhaps
encountered the largest amount of coercion from the PRC government. As a city
operating under its own administration while operating within the guidelines of the
PRC, the legislative process is not going to be straight forward, especially when the
PRC government has been very much involved with Hong Kong’s policy making
process since the drafting of the Basic Law. In September of 2002, the proposal for
the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was submitted to LEGCO
(News.gov.hk – LCQ2).
Article 23 states:
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact law on its own to prevent
any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s
Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or
bodies from conducting political activities in the region, and to prohibit political
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organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political
organizations or bodies.” (China – The Basic Law of HKSAR)
What this essentially means is that the PRC intends to implement precautionary
measures against potential threats to national security within the Hong Kong
government. If implemented, this policy effectively gives the city’s judicial arm much
more power and authority. It would also limit many liberties that the Hong Kong
people enjoy, such as their freedom of speech, protest and information. Article 23
was basically an attempt to completely reformat Hong Kong’s judicial system to
operate in a similar fashion to the PRC’s judicial body. This was by far the most
drastic step from the PRC to imprint its control on the Hong Kong community. The
drafting process was expedited by the Central People’s Government, as they had
pressure the CE then, Tung, into passing the legislation quickly. As the CE, Tung did
not have authority over LEGCO but he did hold the power to authorize legislations,
because part of the CE’s responsibility is drafting and approving legislations
(Horlemann). There were rumors that Tung was under an abnormal amount of
pressure from the CPG due to a personal debt that he owed to the CPG government.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Tung’s company was saved from bankruptcy by a
US$100 million loan from a Mainland Chinese enterprise and tacitly accepted by the
Chinese government. His firm is now one of the world’s largest shipping
conglomerates and has a large amount trade with China (Horlemann). The proposal
for the implementation of article 23 was 76 pages long with an extremely detailed
description of all the terms like treason, secession, sedition and subversion. Even
the penalties for any offenses that qualify as treason, secession, sedition and
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subversion are clearly outlined in the document. For example, when dealing with
“seditious” publications, this is the suggested response:
“Given the serious consequences that may be brought about by publications
endangering national security, the existing penalties are on the low side. We suggest
7 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $500,000 to act as an effective deterrent. The
publications should be forfeited.” (News.gov.hk – LCQ2)
Despite the longevity of the document, it still fails to provide an adequate
explanation of what types of material or publications qualify as treasonous or
seditious, which means that any type of judgment will be interpreted by the Central
People’s Government. Not only does article 23 indirectly violate many of the Basic
Laws that were put in place to protect Hong Kong’s liberties, it also gives the CPG a
certain amount of control over Hong Kong’s judicial and legislative process.
The initial reaction to article 23 from the Hong Kong people was absolutely
disastrous (needless to say). Before article 23 was passed and within two months of
its appearance in LEGCO, there were already around 65,000 thousand people
protesting against the legislation. Furthermore, about 190,000 people had signed a
petition against the legislation. On July 1st of 2003, a large scale protest was
organized to show the Hong Kong people’s disapproval toward the Hong Kong
government, the Chinese government for trying to implement article 23 of the Basic
Law. According to reports, the initial protest had a predicted attendance of around
20,000 but according to the police and protestors, there was upwards of half a
million people present at the protest (China Review after HK Protest – cnn.com).
The implementation of article 23 has since been shelved indefinitely due to the
major public uproar. The July 1st protest has now become an annual event, where
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the Hong Kong people continue to voice their disapproval of the government; the
attendance of the protest is also steadily rising.
It is easy to pinpoint the areas of Hong Kong’s government that are
influenced by the PRC government. And to a certain degree, some form of political
assimilation could be beneficial. However, the changes that the Chinese government
has attempted to make have caused a lot of resentment toward the PRC within the
Hong Kong community. It is in Hong Kong and China’s best interest to slow down
the bridging of administration because democracy and communism are too
fundamentally different to convert one to the other overnight. While Hong Kong’s
political future is still very much unrevealed, there have been signs of restriction
coming from the PRC. According to article 45 of the Basic Law:
“…The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the
actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance
with the principle of gradual and orderly process. The ultimate aim is the selection of
the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedure.” (China – The Basic
Law of HKSAR)
The Hong Kong government had aimed to elect a CE through universal suffrage after
the 2007 elections, but the CPG has blocked that possibility, stating that Hong
Kong’s CE will continue to be elected by its election committee and appointed by the
People’s Congress. There have been no other recent reports of when or if Hong
Kong’s election process will ever achieve universal suffrage. There might be an
impending doom for Hong Kong’s administration merely based on the fact that the
CPG has time and time again neglected the laws from the Basic Law, which they in
fact helped create, interpreting these laws in their favor, or just completely
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reinterpreting them. The One Country Two System might just be a force field filled
with holes.
The political relationship between Hong Kong and China is perhaps the most
sensitive aspect, due to the fact that it holds the key to determining the fate of Hong
Kong’s future autonomous status. The few attempts the PRC government made to
impose policies on Hong Kong have ended in catastrophe, as seen with Hong Kong’s
response to article 23 of the Basic Law. As long as the One Country Two System is in
place, it provides the Hong Kong community with the necessary platform and
freedoms to reject any form of Chinese imposition. This begs to question how the
PRC government would handle the Hong Kong community if the One Country Two
System were not in effect.
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Chapter 3 – Who Needs Border Control?
The island of Hong Kong is located in the Southeastern border of China. It has
a total landmass of 1,104 km2 and is home to 7.2 million people. It is one of the most
densely populated cities in the world with a land-per-capita of about only 6.5 m2
(The CIA World Factbook – Hong Kong). As such a small and dense city, it is crucial
to ensure that the population has a dependable supply of food, water, electricity and
shelter. As an autonomous extension of the PRC, many of such resources are
imported by the PRC, and as a prominent port city, countries in Southeast Asia can
also import other resources.
A metropolitan city such as Hong Kong relies greatly on its service industry
and especially with a massively increasing amount of Chinese tourists visiting each
year, with 28 million from 2011, approximately a 100% increase since 2007 (Lim,
Louisa – npr.com), tourism plays a major part is the city’s economic growth. The
increasing amounts of tourists are tremendous for the economy, but what happens
when the tourists begin to compete for resources with the local people? What
happens when the tourists want to stay? Hong Kong is now facing such a problem.
Chinese tourists spent a total $14 billion, last year, a 35% increase from the
year before (Lim, Louisa – npr.com). Large conglomerates, chain stores and real
estate moguls who have stores or property in central business districts such as
Central, Causeway Bay or Tsim Sha Tsui have been on the receiving end of a
seemingly endless and increasing gold mine. Because Hong Kong has no sales tax,
international luxury brands, such as Gucci, Prada, Chanel, Dolce & Gabbana have
been major beneficiaries of the Chinese tourism surge. The spending prowess of the
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Chinese tourists has created the preferential treatment of store customers. Store
salesmen of these luxury brands, flock towards customers who speak mandarin as
supposed to locals who speak Cantonese. According to the US department of
Commerce, studies have shown that Chinese tourists outspend all other foreign
tourists while on holiday in the US, spending an average of around $6,200 per
person (not including transportation, hotel or food), compared to the average
spending of all other foreign tourists of around $4,000 per person (not including
transportation, hotel or food) (Lim, Louisa – npr.com). This extra tendency to
“splurge” by Chinese tourists has caused store salesmen to completely neglect local
shoppers because of their more conservative spending habits. In January of 2012,
the flagship store of Dolce & Gabbana, an international luxury brand, caused a huge
uproar within Hong Kong community by prohibiting any photo taking in front of
the store. Mainland Chinese tourist were apparently exempted from this rule, where
a security guard allegedly told the Hong Kong photographers to “get lost” and that
only mainland Chinese tourists are allowed to take pictures of the storefront. The
main concern of the public was that how can a store hold the authority to determine
the photography privileges of Hong Kong’s public space, and furthermore reserving
that privilege for Chinese tourists because of their spending habits. Within the week
of the incident, over a thousand protestors crowded in front of the store located in
the central shopping district of Tsim Sha Tsui, chanting against the discrimination of
Hong Kongers. The police barricaded the store the store was forced to close early.
The head offices of Dolce & Gabbana have since issued a public apology to the Hong
Kong people regarding the incident. This incident was an isolated and extreme case;
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however, it highlights the preferential treatment toward the free spending Chinese
tourists and creates a tremendous amount of tension between the Hong Kong and
the Chinese.
Hong Kong has superb benefits and government support. All Hong Kong
citizens are entitled to twelve years of complimentary education, first class
healthcare, benefits that are funded by Hong Kong taxpayers. For the past couple of
years, the Mainland Chinese have attempted to “get in on the action.” Not only do
they account for two thirds of all of Hong Kong’s tourists, 40% of babies born in
Hong Kong in 2011 belonged to mothers from Mainland China. This staggering
statistic is perhaps even more harmful than the flooding of Chinese tourists.
The birth of these babies can potentially cause many problems in the future,
especially in the next twenty years. These babies with Mainland Chinese mothers
whom are born in Hong Kong are now automatically eligible to become permanent
Hong Kong residences and are then entitled to all the benefits that the Hong Kong
government provides, which include, twelve complimentary years of education,
government supported healthcare and other benefits that are unavailable in China.
This effectively creates the problem of “representation without taxation.” The fact
that these babies are born to non-Hong Kong parents also means that their parents
do not pay Hong Kong taxes, and yet their children are entitled to the benefits
funded by Hong Kong taxpayers. This poses a potential economic problem. It is also
speculated that these Chinese families are determined to give birth in Hong Kong to
escape the family planning restrictions of China, such as the One Child Policy, or to
escape the restrictions of the Houkou, the household registration system. Since
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Hong Kong is an autonomous region, it is exempted from all restrictions from the
CCP government.
One of the problems that Hong Kong born Mainland Chinese babies causes is
the exacerbation of a growing aging problem within Hong Kong. As of 2011, Hong
Kong population age structure is as followed: the population aged 0 – 14 years of
age, take up 11.6% of the city’s population; the population aged 15 – 65 years of age,
take up 74.8% of the city’s population, and the population aged 65 years of age and
above, take up 13.5% of the city’s population. Hong Kong also has an exceedingly
high average life expectancy of 82.12 years, the 8th highest in the world. It also has a
very low fertility rate of 1.09 children born per woman, the 3rd lowest of any place in
the world, only above Macau and Singapore, and a birth rate of 7.54 births per 1,000
population and a death rate of 7.23 per 1,000 population (The CIA World Factbook –
Hong Kong). What do these statistics mean? With the majority of the present
population within the age range of 15 – 65, it means that, presently, the majority of
the population is part of the city’s work force, and with such a low fertility and birth
rate, the work force will only shrink in size. The high life expectancy, partnered with
the low fertility rate, means that the percentage of the population aged 65 and older,
will only increase. This means that an increase in government expenditure for
government supported healthcare programs for the elderly is inevitable. In 2005,
the Hong Kong government spent $14 billion on elderly medical programs; this
number will increase substantially under the city’s current population trend. With
the birth rate and death rate almost equal, it means that the population size has
essentially “plateaued”. How does the influx of Hong Kong born Chinese babies fit
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into this population trend? Hong Kong is essentially used as a medium for these
mothers to deliver their babies to bypass the restrictions of the Chinese
government, but the parents of the these babies do not have the right to abode in
Hong Kong; therefore, these babies that are born in Hong Kong will return to China
after birth. And since 40% of Hong Kong’s babies from 2011, are born to Mainland
Chinese mothers, it lowers the replacement rate of the city’s aging work force
substantially. This means that in about 15 – 20 years, Hong Kong’s work force will
have a sudden drop off, which could potentially be very detrimental to the city’s
development.
Another problem that these Hong Kong born Chinese babies poses is the
cultural repercussions. Hong Kong has a very strong cultural identity. It is an
identity fostered and developed from the collective influences of British colonization
and Chinese roots, and it is unique to people who were born and raised in Hong
Kong. This cultural identity is partially the cause of the current tension between
Hong Kong and China. Since the 1997 handover, Hong Kong has been resisting and
rejecting the inevitable cultural changes. These changes are in a way more powerful
than government policies. These changes will be subconsciously implemented
incrementally from generation to generation, until the point where a new identity is
formed and completely replaces and erases the traces of the previous identity. Hong
Kong is now experiencing the “de-British-ization” or the “Chinese-ification” of a new
era. The former generations of British colonization distanced itself from its Chinese
roots but newer generations will become more and more welcoming to Chinese
culture. This process will be expedited by the influx of Hong Kong born Chinese. The
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40% Hong Kong born Chinese of 2011 and the “x”% of Hong Kong born Chinese of
future years will dilute this anti-China sentiment and bring Hong Kong culture
closer to China.
Perhaps the most problematic issue is the matter of resources. In 2011, there
were a total of 43,982 Mainland women who gave birth in Hong Kong, as compared
to the 7,810 in 2001 (Hong Kong - LegCo). This major increase is can be attributed
to the loosened border-crossing policies and restrictions. Another staggering
statistic is the number of Mainland women who gave birth in Hong Kong with
spouses who were non-Hong Kong residents. In 2011, 35,736 Mainland women who
gave birth in Hong Kong had spouses who were non-Hong Kong residents, 81.3% of
the total number Mainland women, as compared to the 620 in 2001, only 7.9% of
that year’s total number (Hong Kong - LegCo). This means that in 2001, most of the
babies born from Mainland women were because of “cross-border” relations or
marriages, which makes the births more “legitimate” and suggests that those
women were entitled to the access of Hong Kong’s healthcare because of their
spouse. In 2011, 81.3% of the families who came to Hong Kong to give birth, only
came to Hong Kong for the sole purpose of gaining access to Hong Kong’s medical
resources and obtaining permanent residencies for their children. These families
end up competing with local mothers for spaces in maternities wards, and while
these families and local mothers pay the same amount of money for the use of
maternity wards, local mothers pay Hong Kong taxes, which incites the debate of
whether these local mothers should have priority access to the Hong Kong
maternity wards. Maggie Wong, a 31-year-old office clerk and a lifelong Hong Kong
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resident gave birth to twins eight months ago. Three and a half months into her
pregnancy, she wanted to schedule an appointment with maternity wards of public
hospitals because it is much cheaper than the maternity wards of private hospitals.
However, all the dates around her expected due date were all booked up by
pregnant women from the Mainland, forcing her to have to make an appointment at
a private hospital and use her husband’s life savings and borrow money from her
parents. Her concern was that, as a Hong Kong taxpayer and a permanent resident,
why did she not have access to benefits that she was entitled to? On top of that, she
was also forced to add to her family’s financial burden just to ensure the healthy and
safe birth of her children (LeFraniere, Sharon – nytimes.com).
After much public outcry and protest from the Hong Kong community, the
Hong Kong government has began to issue new regulations to combat the increasing
number of Mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong. Firstly, starting with the
year 2012, the Hong Kong government has agreed to lower the quota for the
number of pregnant Mainland women allowed to give birth in Hong Kong to 35,000,
3,400 spots in public hospitals and 31,000 spots in private hospitals, after a total of
43,982 Mainland women gave birth in Hong Kong in 2011 (Hong Kong - LegCo). On
top of this, Mainland women who want to give birth in Hong Kong must have a prior
appointment with a Hong Kong hospital and the correct certification obtained
through scheduled prenatal checks with the hospital, in order to be granted access
to Hong Kong’s maternity wards, regardless of whether it is a public or private
hospital. Despite such strict regulations, many Mainland women still find ways to
by-pass these rules (Hong Kong - LegCo). In the year 2011, around 1,657 Mainland
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women gave birth in the Accident & Emergency department of Hong Kong hospitals,
the emergency room (Hong Kong - LegCo). This not only disrupts the operation of
the ER of these hospitals but also endangers the mothers and babies because the
ER’s are not equipped with the suitable equipment and staff for delivering a baby.
This is known as “gate-crashing.” These Mainland mothers scheme to give birth in
the ER by taking private cross-boundary vehicles, or by simply wearing baggy
clothing that conceals any sign of pregnancy, because they did not have a prior
appointment with a Hong Kong hospital or that they did not have the required
certification (Hong Kong - LegCo). In a LEGCO meeting held in February 2012, it was
agreed that tightening border control and eliminating third party intermediaries
were the best ways to eliminate “gate-crashing.” An increase of immigration officers
and medical personnel at immigration control points would be set up to spot these
Mainland women who try to enter the city without the correct documentation or
certification. Cooperation with the Mainland border control is also crucial to the
process. The Hong Kong Hospital Authority has also implemented higher rates for
Mainland women who want to access to Hong Kong’s maternity wards, where the
fees are solely based on the status of the pregnant woman (Hong Kong - LegCo). It
was also agreed that local women who were permanent residences of Hong Kong
would get priority access to the maternity wards of all Hong Kong hospitals.
Hong Kong’s newly elected CE, Leung Chun Ying, has already taken the first
steps to tightening regulations against pregnant women from Mainland China.
Leung proposed a “zero-quota” plan for Mainland Chinese pregnant women who do
not have spouses who are not Hong Kong citizens. The zero-quota plan only applies
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to Hong Kong’s private hospitals. The 12 members of Hong Kong’s Private Hospital
Association agreed that, all private hospitals would only provide obstetrics services
to mainland women married to Hong Kong citizens. Leung’s plan also included a
section that raised the possibility of not guaranteeing citizenship to all children born
to mainland parent in Hong Kong. While Leung’s plan is a solid first step to
preserving Hong Kong’s benefits, it may cause a significant increase in obstetric
units in public hospitals, which could be problematic because many maternity
wards in public hospitals are understaffed and underfunded (Mok, Danny –
scmp.com).
It is important to understand that the reason Hong Kong is so appealing to
the Mainland Chinese, is because Hong Kong has a way of life that is unattainable in
China. However, the ways in which the Mainland Chinese are going about to obtain
the Hong Kong benefits are causing much harm to the relationship between the
Hong Kong community and Chinese. New regulations such as free trade agreements
have relaxed border control between China and Hong Kong but it will be crucial to
regulate Mainland China’s access into China to avoid creating more unnecessary
conflict between the two.
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Chapter 4 – Please Mind the Gap between the Train and the Platform
With the increasing amount of interaction between the Mainland Chinese and
Hong Kong, it is vital to Hong Kong’s longevity and survival to find suitable and
viable solutions to strengthen the hopes for brighter future under the Chinese
umbrella. The increased numbers of Mainland Chinese in Hong Kong creates the
feeling within the Hong Kong community that these Mainland Chinese are
“invading” or “infiltrating” their territory. It has gotten to the point where the public
now refers to the visiting Mainland Chinese as “locust” during protests because they
see them as a harmful swarm that consume Hong Kong’s valuable and limited
resources and interferes with the lives of the local residence.
The Hong Kong people often complain that the Mainland Chinese people are
rude and have no manners. They walk around Hong Kong as if they “own the place.”
They ignore the peace and order that the Hong Kong people have abided by years.
The most common examples that are cited are that the Mainland Chinese spit on the
streets, when Hong Kong has strict penalties and fines against littering, and that the
Mainland Chinese are always cutting in line. These examples are generalized but are,
for the most part, true. Hong Kong society has a much stricter sense of order that
was influenced by the British, and public order is a cornerstone to being a Hong
Kong citizen. However, Chinese society is radically different. It is common practice
for people to spit on the streets and disregard a line, because these actions are not
reprimanded or frowned upon. It is simply a matter of cultural difference. Not so
long ago, Hong Kong’s prosperity had fueled 7 million egos to look down upon the
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struggling Mainland Chinese. Now that the roles have somewhat reversed, it creates
a bitter feeling of becoming less important.
It could be argued that Mainland Chinese have been wrongfully victimized or
misunderstood. Yes, they do spend tons of money on shopping in Hong Kong, mainly
because products are more dependable and cheaper. They want their children to be
born in Hong Kong, simply because Hong Kong’s level of healthcare is world-class
and also that having their children born in Hong Kong potentially promises a higher
standard of living as well as prospective political freedom. The Mainland Chinese do
not make these decisions with the intention of “infiltrating” or “invading” Hong
Kong. It is simply an aftershock effect and the by-product of pursuing a “better life”,
a misinterpretation of intention by Hong Kongers.
In reality, Hong Kong has more control over the situation than it seems. The
majority of the resistance and rejection of the Chinese culture is produced by the
Hong Kong community not the Mainland Chinese. Their pride blinds them, and they
fail to comprehend that China holds the key to their future economic, political and
social prosperity. And by escalating this tension between with the Mainland Chinese,
it can only damage the chances of a healthy partnership in the future.
In early 2012, a Mainland family was in Hong Kong for holiday. While they
were riding the MTR, Hong Kong subway system, the daughter of the family was
eating a pack of dried noodles and apparently making a mess. Eating and drinking is
indeed prohibited in most forms of transportation in Hong Kong, but is never
strictly enforced. A local Hong Kong man, Ken, was quick to reprimand the Mainland
family for allowing their daughter to eat in the train, when it is supposedly not
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permitted. The child’s mother proceeded to engage Ken in a heated verbal exchange,
when the easy solution would have been to ask her daughter to stop eating and
maybe even apologize. This yelling match between the Mainland Chinese mother
and Ken was videotaped and quick to become the next YouTube sensation in Hong
Kong. After watching the video, there are a few things that become very evident.
Firstly, the way the Hong Kong and Mainland bystanders quickly rallied behind each
of their parties, until the confrontation became an argument between witnesses.
Secondly, Ken’s argument quickly escalates from “You should not be eating in the
train” to “This is what the Mainland people do. This is Hong Kong. Respect the rules
of Hong Kong. Get off the train now!” This begs to question whether this
confrontation would have even taken place if the person eating on the train was
from Hong Kong. Third and lastly, the children from the Mainland were quick to
admit their own mistake and even went as far as to yell out, “My mother’s the one at
fault”, the child’s response was quickly answered by a discreet shush from her
mother. This is when another Mainland Chinese woman joined in to provide the
mother with reinforcements. This is the perfect embodiment of the social tension
that exists between the Hong Kong and Chinese. It has become a competition of
whose ego is larger, a competition of who can yell louder. The video proves that the
Mainland Chinese people are not without reason, as the children involved were able
to point out the party at fault, even though it was their mother. The video can also be
used as an example of local Hong Kong people picking at the Mainland Chinese for
miniscule things, and subsequently blowing them out of proportion.
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Unfortunately, the controversy of the MTR incident does not end there. Kong
Qingdong, a professor from Peking University, one of China’s most prestigious
universities, went on an internet talk-show in China and denounced Hong Kong in
an extreme fashion. In the video, which of course became a YouTube sensation as
well, Kong called the Hong Kong people dogs for not speaking the national language,
mandarin. His rationale was that all Chinese people have an obligation to know how
to speak mandarin. While people from the north, east, south or west have their own
dialects, they should always have mandarin as a common dialect, because it is part
of the Chinese identity. He continues to discredit Hong Kong by saying that they all
of their strengths as a community and city are only credited to the colonization by
Great Britain. He also calls the Hong Kong people bastards, because they often say
they are from Hong Kong not China. Needless to say, Kong’s video was well
circulated in the Hong Kong community as well as the Mainland Chinese community.
When asked about the incident, China’s Minister of Education has this to say: “We
require our teachers to adhere to the notion that the mainland and Hong Kong are
one family, and people from both sides should show respect towards each other.”
Proposals to sanction the professor for misconduct have also been brought forth to
the Ministry of Education, who has yet to produce a verdict. While Kong’s rant was
extremely demeaning and condescending towards Hong Kong, it was not without
truth. Yes, much of Hong Kong’s culture and identity can only be credited to the
British, because Hong Kong was a British colony for more than a century, and before
that Hong Kong was just a small fishing village. During the colonization under
Britain, much of Hong Kong’s identity derived from distancing itself from China, but
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that is now rapidly changing. The cultural assimilation between the two is
happening much faster than the economic and political assimilation, which is one
reason why these social tensions are escalating at such an extreme pace. Hong
Kong’s new identity as Chinese is only 15 years old and still in a fledgling stage. It
will certainly take more time for the cultural shift to take effect, but as new
generations of Hong Kong people replace the old, the hostility between the Hong
Kong and Chinese will eventually transform into the harmony of the Chinese. In the
meantime, whatever can be done to facilitate the shift should be carried out swiftly.
I believe the first step to reconciliation between Hong Kong and Mainland
Chinese has to be increased awareness and mutual understanding. When examining
the economic relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, it is exceedingly
rare to hear about disagreements or verbal spats between parties. And the reason
for that is because of the professional nature of the relationship. Both parties
understand that a successful relationship will be mutually beneficial. Therefore,
both parties make an extra effort to accommodate the other. At the general level of
community, the situation is indeed different, but still applicable. Both the Hong Kong
and Chinese people must understand that under the right leadership and
cooperation, the partnership between Hong Kong and China can be a long lasting
and prosperous one. Much of the disagreement between the two parties stems from
the lower to middle class that lack exposure to one another. Recently, the Hong
Kong and Chinese online community has been engaging in an unhealthy exchange of
jabs. This confrontation, which is exclusively within the internet communities, was
fueled by events such as the MTR argument and the large increase of pregnant
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Mainland women in Hong Kong. The
“patient-zero” of this war of ad
campaigns depicted a large locust
sitting atop of Hong Kong’s iconic Lion
Rock with the Victoria Harbor in the
background, and in bold words it says:
“Are you willing for Hong Kong to
spend $1,000,000 per 18 minutes to
accommodate foreign born children?
The Hong Kong people have had
Figure 3 Hong Kong’s locust poster

enough!” Furthermore, the ad requests
that the Hong Kong government reinterpret article 24 of the Basic Law, which states
the guidelines and requirements to the right to abode in Hong Kong (see figure 3).
These posters were published in all major Hong Kong newspapers, taking up an
entire page and served as a sarcastic metaphor for the mainlanders’ consumption of
Hong Kong’s resources. This poster sparked a mocking response from the Mainland
internet community. The poster depicted a child sitting on his father’s shoulder. The
ad was meant to emphasize the fact that the Chinese government (the father) pays
Hong Kong (the son) over $200 billion Yuan a year, referring to the spending of
Mainland Chinese tourists each year (Chow, Vivienne – South China Morning Post).
The respective internet communities would continue in the form of
responserebuttalresponse. All of these campaign posters are extremely
demeaning to the other party; both parties touch on the fact that they are merely
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“tolerating” the other not “accepting” them. This again has to do with the lack of
exposure between the two. The large amounts of Mainland tourists who come to
Hong Kong for holiday are from the upper echelons of Chinese society, the 28
million tourists who come to Hong Kong, barely account for 0.02% of China’s
population. While a trip to Hong Kong may not be able to be afforded by most,
government sponsored initiatives, such as the Asia Society, which was a highly
successful foundation founded by the Rockefellers to attempt to bridge the gap
between the East and the West, between Hong Kong and China could help bridge the
social gap between the people of lower to middle class. Furthermore, both
governments must play a more active role in discouraging the criticism of the
opposing party. A healthy and demonstrative relationship between the two
governments could be a suitable role model for future generations to follow.
Another important and helpful factor that could be a defining factor in the
Sino-Hong Kong relationship is the politics of language. The national language of
China is mandarin and yet there are up to 250 languages spoken within China.
Cantonese is one of the most commonly spoken Chinese dialects. It is the main
dialect spoken by the Hong Kong people. Since its days of colonization, the teaching
and learning of English was greatly endorsed for obvious reasons. However, since
the 1997 handover, the emphasis has shifted and most Hong Kong schools now have
required mandarin as a subject. Globalizing mandarin as a first language along with
Cantonese in Hong Kong will be one of Hong Kong’s most vital steps to creating its
Chinese identity. Hong Kong people are notoriously bad mandarin speakers. The
canton accent mandarin is a common joke within China and Hong Kong. Therefore,
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it is important for the older generations to improve on their mandarin as well. Not
only will Hong Kong’s learning and improving of their mandarin be a sign of good
faith toward the Mainland Chinese, but will also serve as a public indication that
Hong Kong is a part of China and Hong Kong people are from China.
There is definitely no guaranteed solution to resolving the current tension
between the Mainland Chinese and the Hong Kongers, but the most important step
for both parties is to understand and acknowledge the causes and reasons behind
the conflict. Most often times, tensions that arise between cultures are caused by of
clash of values and beliefs. This tension is further reinforced by ego and pride in
respective cultures. Appeasing the tension should start by identifying the exact
areas of conflict between the cultures. In the case of Hong Kongers and the Mainland
Chinese, mutual acceptance is the most crucial step. As the largest country in the
world in terms of population, China is home to many different cultures but is yet
able to avoid domestic cultural conflicts. Why is that? It is because all these cultures
ultimately acknowledge themselves as apart of the greater category of being from
China. The Hong Kongers and the Mainland Chinese view each other as foreigners.
The next step is relinquishing cultural pride. Whether Hong Kongers accept it or not,
Hong Kong is now and forever will be apart of China. Becoming more “Chinese” is
not betraying or surrendering the Hong Kong culture, but honoring and preserving
it. It is a Hong Kong misconception that the Chinese government is actively trying to
limit Hong Kong’s freedoms and rights but that is not necessarily true. It is also a
Hong Kong misconception that accepting the Chinese culture means that Hong
Kongers will have to walk, talk or act like the Mainland Chinese, which is also not
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true. It is quite the opposite. Hong Kong is most valuable to China as a cooperative
political and economic haven and the chances of protecting Hong Kong’s rights and
liberties might actually be enhanced if the city peacefully cooperated with the
Chinese government.
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Conclusion – What next?
What next? This billion-dollar question does not yet have a definite answer,
but educated predictions can certainly be provided. Based on the factors examined
in my thesis: the social effects of China’s growing economy, Hong Kong’s
autonomous Status and Hong Kong’s resource constraints, I believe that Hong
Kong’s fate is determinant of one single factor; becoming “Chinese.” Based on my
findings, in all three cases, the Hong Kong people feel threatened by the Mainland
Chinese people’s money and demeanor because they view them as foreigners. The
Hong Kong community must acknowledge and accept the fact that in order to
preserve the city’s integrity, they must embrace their new identity, by welcoming
the imminent assimilation of Hong Kong and China. They must accept that they are
Chinese and they are from China, and that China’s progress is their progress.
The assimilation of two cultures with fundamentally different backgrounds
of development and prosperity is, without a doubt, extremely difficult. When dealing
with cultural assimilation, the emergence of cross-cultural conflict or tension is
often times inevitable. These conflicts are most often incited by inequalities and
clashes in belief systems. Therefore, attempts to adjust these conflicts have to be
approached carefully and sensitively, as any irrational actions can lead to masses of
disgruntled people. In Hong Kong and Mainland China’s case, the cultural tension
stems from the PRC government’s “preferential treatment” of Hong Kong and the
Mainland Chinese people’s exploitation of Hong Kong resources. Currently, there are
several emerging factors that could help the situation. Firstly, the new CE’s zeroquota for Mainland pregnant women in private hospitals could improve the tension.
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Despite the fact that it gives a feeling that the Mainland Chinese are not allowed
access to Hong Kong resources, it is very important for the Hong Kong people to feel
that their government is trying to protect their people and their rights. Secondly,
there have been reports of Hong Kong switching its driving lane and the driver’s
seat to the right, in order to match China’s road systems and increase direct traffic
between Hong Kong and Mainland China. Policies such as these will certainly be
incredibly difficult to implement not only because of the amount of cars that Hong
Kong has, but also because switching lanes would potentially cause many traffic
accidents. These ideas are a good starting point to establishing a healthy link
between Hong Kong and China.
Hong Kong’s economic stature will surely diminish with the stable and
phenomenal growth from the Chinese economy. Hong Kong’s autonomy may
continue to be preserved by the PRC government in order to prevent any major
dissent. The city’s resources will have to be regulated more strictly by the Hong
Kong government to prevent any negative repercussions. Expect to see the Hong
Kong and PRC government work much more closely, and the PRC government’s role
and presence in Hong Kong progressively increase. If my predictions and analysis
are accurate, the outlook for Hong Kong and China continues to look bright and
promising.
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